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New technologies such as product simulators and virtual reality now allow firms to provide realistic product
usage experiences and reduce buyer uncertainty about product quality. We argue that today’s firms should
view product design and investments to reduce buyer uncertainty as an integrated process, which is in turn
influenced by how much information buyers can obtain from third-party infomediaries. We introduce a game-
theoretic model of a competitive market where both quality production and quality disclosure are
endogenous decisions, affected by information made available by third parties. We show that quality
investment under uncertainty never exceeds the level of quality investment under perfect information.
Furthermore, we show that information availability by third parties allows firms to free ride, and it especially
favors lower quality firms, who can reduce their information disclosure investments more so than higher-
quality firms. Finally, we show that the intuitive argument that firms must improve their product quality when
overall information availability in the market improves does not always hold. Instead, improved information
availability may enable firms to reduce their quality in some situations.
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New technologies such as product simulators and virtual reality now allow firms to provide realistic product
usage experiences and reduce buyer uncertainty about product quality. We argue that today’s firms should
view product design and investments to reduce buyer uncertainty as an integrated process, which is in turn
influenced by how much information buyers can obtain from third-party infomediaries. We introduce a game-
theoretic model of a competitive market where both quality production and quality disclosure are endogenous
decisions, affected by information made available by third parties. We show that quality investment under
uncertainty never exceeds the level of quality investment under perfect information. Further, we show that
information availability by third parties allows firms to free ride, and especially favors lower quality firms,
who can reduce their information disclosure investments more so than higher quality firms. Finally, we
show that the intuitive argument that firms must improve their product quality when overall information
availability in the market improves does not always hold, and it may in some situations enable them to
reduce their quality instead.
Key words : Buyer uncertainty, information disclosure, product quality, infomediaries
1. Introduction
A major activity in markets is the transfer of product information by firms and third-party interme-
diaries to buyers. New technology allows firms to improve buyer knowledge about their products.
Sellers can showcase video instructions of product use, as Apple does for its laptops, and can
employ technology that allows buyers to simulate the experience of owning the actual product, as
gaming company Electronic Arts does with its playable demos. Emerging technologies like Virtual
Reality further allow firms to give consumers realistic product usage experiences prior to purchase.
Technology has also made it easy for consumers to acquire product information from independent
third-parties (Montgomery et al. 2004). These infomediaries offer expert product evaluations (Chen
and Xie 2005), aggregate consumer reviews (Koh et al. 2010), or educate consumers about the
product category in general. Many retailers, such as Amazon and J&R Electronics, also offer
consumer reviews and expert product evaluations. The social commerce trend, currently exemplified
by firms such as Facebook and Pinterest, also allows consumers to share product information and
assessments with one another. The consequences of this “ambient information” made available by
1
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third parties is that consumers have an important alternative source of product information and
need not rely exclusively on information provided by the manufacturers.
While product videos, product simulators, playable demos and other similar technologies can
make it easier for firms to provide product quality information to consumers, they can be expensive.
For example, playable game demos for PC games are non-trivial investments (Crossley 2010) and
Electronic Arts has discussed the possibility of charging $10-$15 per comprehensive game demo
(Martin 2010), in order to justify the extra development costs. In fact, we collected data on 2196
PC games released between 1996 and 2005 and found that only 55% invested in creating a playable
demo. Firms have to determine when it is worthwhile to invest in product information disclosure
and, in particular, assess how ambient information availability affects these decisions. Further,
given the growing importance of information investments, these investments should be viewed as
an integral part of the product design process. Firms have to determine how much to invest in
quality given the subsequent cost of informing customers about these quality attributes.
Consider two printer manufacturers who have recently released different printer models, one of
which is high-end, while the other is a budget model. When trying to determine whether to invest
in information disclosure, the firms face different choices and trade-offs due to their difference
in quality. Consider further that a popular intermediary has just released a thorough and fair
quality review on the two models. Should the firms adjust their plans for information disclosure
investments, as a result? If so, should the adjustment be different for the two firms? Should the
adjustment account for what the other firm is doing?
The key managerial questions in this paper are tied to quality selection and disclosure in the
backdrop of alternative product information sources – such as infomediaries – who offer information
that can largely substitute the type of information traditionally provided by sellers1. First, we ask
how firms should invest in informing consumers and, in particular, how product quality influences
this decision. Second, we ask how firms should factor in the cost of future information disclosure
when choosing product quality levels. Finally, we ask how ambient information from external
sources of product information affects the answers to the above questions.
To answer these questions, we present what is to the best of our knowledge the first model
of a competitive market where both quality production and quality disclosure are endogenous
decisions, affected by information made available by third parties. The model incorporates all the
1 For example, a photographer who needs detailed information about the sharpness of a certain Nikon camera lens can
visit Nikons website, or she can visit DxO Labs (dxomark.com), which puts cameras and lenses through standardized
tests and often provides more information on Nikon lenses, than Nikon does. Similarly, a consumer who wants to
obtain quality information about a Samsung mobile phone can visit Samsung’s own website which includes detailed
photos from 5-6 different angles. Alternatively, he can visit phonearena.com, which also includes 3D product views. In
these and uncountable other examples, sellers and third parties offer quality information that is largely substitutable.
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Figure 1 Key interactions considered by our model.
four interactions shown in Figure 1, namely the impact of quality production on disclosure, the
impact of future disclosure costs on quality production and the impact of ambient information
in the market on both these interactions. We first show that the ex-ante probability of quality
disclosure increases smoothly with equilibrium quality. Building on this simple result, we show
that firms should view product quality investments and information disclosure investments as an
integrated process, and that doing so results in lower quality investments by firms. Further, we
show that information availability by third parties allows firms to free ride, and especially favors
lower quality firms, who can reduce their information disclosure investments more so than higher
quality firms. Finally, we show that information made available by third parties may not always
lead firms to improve their quality, and it may actually enable them to reduce their quality instead.
2. Related Literature
Much of the current research on product information traces back to the work of Grossman, Mil-
grom, and Hart (Grossman and Hart 1980; Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981) and the “unraveling
mechanism”. The mechanism explains that high quality sellers first report their product quality in
order to separate themselves from the group of sellers with unknown quality. That leaves another
set of sellers as the highest quality sellers in the group that has not reported yet, giving them the
incentive to report their quality in turn, and so on, until all but the lowest quality sellers have
provided quality information. Grossman (1981) showed that a similar argument applies even to
monopolists who will want to report all but the lowest possible product quality. Grossman & Hart
argue that “the buyers need not be particularly sophisticated or have repeated experience with the
seller. [. . .] The buyer must just use the simple logic that the seller tries to be as optimistic as
possible about his product subject to the constraint that he not lie” (Grossman and Hart 1980).
Jovanovic (1982) and Shavell (1994) studied how sellers inform consumers about their quality,
when disclosure is costly. They used the unraveling mechanism to show that sellers will invest in
disclosure only above a quality threshold that depends on the investment cost. Empirical support
for the positive impact of higher quality on quality disclosure investments has been provided by
Mathios (2000). There are, however, arguments that claim the opposite, particularly when pricing
is endogenous and can be an alternative signaling mechanism. Chang and Wildt (1994) designed a
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laboratory experiment where they show that “price exerts a positive influence on perceived quality
[. . .] moderated by the importance and amount of intrinsic information”. The role of pricing as a
signaling mechanism is well known (Wolinsky 1983; Milgrom and Roberts 1986a), but Chang &
Wildt show that it can substitute costly quality disclosure. The authors recommend that leading
brands de-emphasize product information and focus more on using prices as a signaling mechanism.
There is also extensive literature on the impact of competition on quality disclosure. Jin (2005)
observes that disclosure investments in the healthcare industry are lower in more competitive mar-
kets. However, Jin argues that because quality disclosure decisions are influenced by the underlying
product quality, the manner in which competition impacts quality disclosure depends on the firms’
quality choices; since the literature makes “ambiguous predictions” on the impact of competition
to product quality (Tirole 1988), the relationship between competition and quality disclosure also
depends on a complex combination of factors. Indeed, on the one hand, there is work that suggests
that the presence of multiple firms sharpens the incentives for information revelation. This may
be because under intense competition even small changes in quality perceptions become important
(Stivers 2004), or because, when the market is unaware that the firms possess any new information,
the announcement by one firm of news, signals to the market that other firms may also possess new
information (Dye and Sridhar 1995). On the other hand, some researchers argue that as the number
of firms increases, sellers avoid disclosing information that may actually sharpen the competition
between them, especially if the information is related to production costs or demand functions that
are privately known to oligopolists (Okuno-Fujiwara et al. 1990), or if the information revealed
educates the consumers about the product category in general, in which case firms in more com-
petitive markets will be less likely to disclose in order to prevent competitors from free riding
on their efforts (Jin 2005). On the same theme of firms trying to alleviate price competition by
withholding product information, Hotz and Xiao (2013) and Board (2009) present duopoly models
where, under certain conditions, a firm may choose to withhold quality information, even if it is
costless and can actually improve consumers’ perceptions about the firm’s quality.
Table 1 lists the relevant literature. In summary, most papers in the literature on quality uncer-
tainty treat firms’ quality choices as exogenous, effectively focusing on interaction A of Figure 1
– highlighted with darker color – at the expense of other interactions. Two notable exceptions
are due to Economides (1993), with a perfect information model, and Albano and Lizzeri (2001),
who present the first uncertainty model to include endogenous quality production in a monopoly
setting. In the model of Albano and Lizzeri (2001) buyers cannot be informed by sellers but only
by infomediaries, and the article’s applicability is somewhat limited to markets with a certification
authority, e.g., an auditor. In another model with similarities to ours, Chen and Xie (2005) investi-
gate quality uncertainty and the role of infomediaries in a duopoly. In the model of Chen and Xie
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Authors Year
Number
of Sellers
Endogenous
Quality?
Endogenous
Disclosure?
Grossman and Hart 1980 N,1 No Yes
Grossman 1981 1 No Yes
Milgrom 1981 N,1 No Yes
Jovanovic 1982 N Large No Yes
Verrecchia 1983 1 No Yes
Matthews and Postlewaite 1985 1 No Yes
Dye 1986 1 No Yes
Milgrom and Roberts 1986b N,1 No Yes
Okuno-Fujiwara et al. 1990 N No Yes
Economides 1993 N Yes No
Shavell 1994 N No Yes
Dye and Sridhar 1995 N No Yes
Albano and Lizzeri 2001 1 Yes Yes
Fishman and Hagerty 2003 1 No Yes
Stivers 2004 N,1 No Yes
Cheong and Kim 2004 N Large No Yes
Chen and Xie 2005 2 No Yes
Board 2009 2 No Yes
Levin et al. 2009 1,2 No Yes
Sun 2011 1 No Yes
Hotz and Xiao 2013 2 No Yes
Present Model 2016 N Yes Yes
Table 1 A comparison of previous models with codified features
(2005) the authors focus solely on information disclosure and not on endogenous quality selection,
or the impact of ambient information to product quality. Ours is the only model to include all the
four key interactions identified in Figure 1. To the best of our knowledge it is the first model of a
competitive market where both quality production and quality disclosure are endogenous decisions.
3. Analytical Model and Solution
3.1. Model and Game Set-Up
In a market of N sellers, products are characterized by one taste and one quality characteristic.
Following (Economides 1989), we represent this in the form of a cylindrical market (see Figure 2).
The unit size circumference represents the taste (type) choices, while the cylinder’s height is the
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quality attribute space. Thus our market is simply the Salop circular market (Salop 1979) extended
vertically to include a quality dimension. Seller enumeration proceeds sequentially and sellers with
sequential indexes are neighbors in the taste space. We further assume that sellers have positioned
their products equidistantly in the taste-space2, at a distance of 1/N .
Each seller targets a specific quality level, denoted by qri for Seller Si, but random factors also
influence the level of quality actually achieved. More specifically, a seller targets quality level qri
by incurring convex costs of quality of the form C(qri) = k · q2ri/2, but the actual level of quality
achieved is qi = qri + , where  is an error term, drawn from a uniform distribution in [−r, r]. The
parameter k controls the quality production cost for a given target quality qri. For example, Figure
2 depicts one instance of our model with four sellers S1, S2, S3 and S4 with (di, qi), i= 1 . . .4, as
the type and quality of their products respectively. In the figure, Sellers S1 and S2 were not able
to reach their targeted quality levels qr1 and qr2, while Sellers S3 and S4 were able to exceed them.
We assume that buyers can obtain perfect information about product types and prices, but not
so for product quality, unless sellers invest to inform them. If the sellers do not invest in information
disclosure, buyers can still obtain some quality information through other sources in the market
(e.g. consumer reviews and third-party infomediaries). Specifically, buyers learn of an interval of
size α that always includes the product’s actual quality. A high value of α describes situations
where there are few outside sources of product quality information and significant uncertainty. A
lower value of α signifies that product quality information is readily available to buyers through
infomediaries.
We call the interval of size α the seller’s quality uncertainty interval, and we assume that a
product may be located anywhere inside the uncertainty interval with equal probability: if a buyer
observes this uncertainty interval, the buyer would form an expectation that Si’s quality is a
random variable qi with uniform PDF fqi(·) and support [qiA, qiB], where qiB = qiA+α. Thus, some
products’ true location would be at the lower end of the uncertainty interval (the product would
appear to be better than it actually is), and others’ would be at the higher end of the interval (the
product’s quality would appear lower than it actually is)3.
2 While horizontal differentiation is not a focus of our model, we retain a type dimension to ensure that sellers are
sufficiently differentiated to have some captive market. In the absence of such a captive market, competition among
sellers degenerates into a type of Bertrand competition in which a seller may want to advertise lower than actual
quality (Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979). These cases are not typical in a study of quality disclosure, and we use the
Salop circle to avoid them.
3 As more information becomes available, the expected quality of the first product would appear to reduce, while the
expected quality of the second product would appear to increase. Both cases, as well as the case of expected product
quality remaining constant when more information emerges, are easily observable in real markets. For example, Li
and Hitt (2008) document wide differences between how books sold on Amazon are initially perceived by buyers when
buyer reviews about them are relatively sparse, and how the same books are perceived in the long run steady state,
when enough reviews have accumulated.
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Figure 2 Our model of product differentiation and buyer uncertainty. In this particular model instance there are
N= 4 sellers. Sellers choose the level of quality investment, which specifies a target quality qri, but the actual
final quality may differ, as it is also affected by random factors.
A way to interpret the operation of third party infomediaries is as follows: buyers who know or
who can correctly anticipate the sellers’ quality investments are uncertain about product quality
within a range of 2r. Ambient market information, due to infomediaries, allows buyers to further
reduce this uncertainty range from 2r to a. The more information infomediaries provide4, the lower
a is assumed to be.
In our model, buyers take into account additional information (e.g., seller disclosure decisions)
and will rationally update the prior [qiA, qiB] before purchasing. Indeed, before purchasing, buyers
will in general have formed uncertainty intervals of different sizes for different sellers, and will have
perfect knowledge about the sellers that disclose their quality.
If sellers are dissatisfied by the level of information that buyers can get from infomediaries, they
can invest in information disclosure, by incurring disclosure cost c. In Figure 2, Sellers S1 and S4
(depicted in the figure without an associated uncertainty interval) have chosen to disclose quality,
while Sellers S2 and S3 have decided not to invest in quality disclosure
5. In this particular model
instance, buyers happen to somewhat underestimate the quality of Seller S3, as q3 is located near
the top of the quality uncertainty interval. At the same time, the buyers’ average estimate for
the quality of Seller S2 is approximately correct, as q2 is located near the center of the quality
uncertainty interval.6
4 we require a<< 2r for any substantial contribution of the infomediaries to buyer knowledge.
5 We assume that sellers can only disclose truthfully. Previous authors have pointed out that “the prospect of litigation
and of loss of future business is enough to stop the seller from making a false claim” (Jovanovic 1982).
6 Throughout the paper we must assume that qri −α− r ≥ 0, that is r and α cannot be so large that buyers would
experience product uncertainty that would imply negative product quality. The exact restriction on the values of r
and α is easy to calculate given the equilibrium solution for target quality, that we derive below.
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Note that in our model the sellers are identical, except for their differentiation in the taste
space. A treatment of the case where sellers are heterogeneous in their cost of quality production
(parameter k) and cost of quality disclosure (parameter c) is provided in the Appendix. For all our
main results, we discuss whether or not the result holds with heterogeneous sellers, and if not, we
explain how to interpret the result in the presence of heterogeneous sellers.
All buyers demand one unit of the product. Each buyer is defined by his most preferred product
location in the taste space z. Buyers are uniformly distributed around the cylinder’s circumference
in this respect. Because the circumference is unit size, the buyers’ most preferred locations are
distributed uniformly in [0,1]. The value to the buyer of purchasing a product with characteristics
(di, qi) and price pi is V (z,σ, di, qi, pi) = v+σ ·qi−pi− t · |z−di|, where v is the buyer’s utility from
consuming a product at the minimum possible quality that is located at his most preferred type,
σ denotes the intensity of the buyer’s preference for quality, and t is the fit cost parameter, which
denotes the disutility that the buyer experiences from consuming a product that is not his ideal.
The parameter t is common to all buyers. Following Economides (1993), we assume that consumers
are heterogeneous in the preference for quality, and that σ is drawn by some distribution G with
support [0, θmax], with expected value E(σ) = θ. A usual additional assumption in spatial models
is that v is large enough so that all the market is served (Hotz and Xiao 2013; Soberman 2004).
This is needed to avoid local monopolies which require substantially different analysis. The exact
requirement for v is shown along with the solution to the symmetric equilibrium, below.
A buyer with preferred product location z and preference for quality σ, when purchasing from
Seller Si, expects utility E(V ) = v+σ ·E(qi)− pi− t · |z− di| where E(·) denotes expected value.
Let si ∈ {0, c} denote the quality disclosure investment cost for Seller Si, which is zero if the seller
does not release quality information and c > 0 otherwise. In addition, we assume that a seller’s
quality uncertainty is fully resolved upon investment by the firm. Revenue for firm Si, in vector
notation, is given by Ri(p,q) = pi ·Di(p,q), and the profit is given by:
Πi(p,q) = pi ·Di(p,q)−C(qri)− si (1)
where Di denotes demand, p is the price vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN) and q is the vector of expected
seller qualities q = (E(qi),E(q2), . . . ,E(qN)). Note that the quality production cost depends on the
seller’s target quality, but demand depends on the buyers’ expectation about actual quality.
Assuming utility maximizing buyers and sellers, we define our game as follows:
Stage 1 Sellers choose their quality investment.
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. . . Sellers learn the quality level that they achieved, and they also learn how their products
are perceived by early users in pre-market trials. They thus learn the uncertainty intervals
that will be associated with their products if they do not invest in information disclosure7.
Stage 2 Sellers decide whether or not to invest in quality disclosure.
. . . Sellers and buyers learn the information of sellers who invested in disclosure, learn from
infomediaries the uncertainty intervals of sellers who have not invested in disclosure, and
update their expectations about product qualities.
Stage 3 Sellers choose their prices.
. . . Buyers enter the market and make their purchase decisions.
Note that we set up the game between sellers and buyers in the backdrop of information availabil-
ity coming from Nature. When discussing the results, we attribute Nature’s choices to infomediaries,
so that our model better connects to real-world markets. However, infomediaries are not strategic
players in our model, and any source of product information, other than the seller of the product,
can assume the role that we assign to them.
3.2. Analytical Solution
We next present the equilibrium solution to the subgame comprised of Stages 3 and 2. The analysis
of these stages is sufficient to intuitively understand our main results. We will then present the
subgame perfect solution of the full game, leaving the analysis of Stage 1 for the Appendix.
3.2.1. Pricing 8
At the start of Stage 3, qualities have been decided, and sellers have made their disclosure
decisions. Buyers have taken into account sellers’ disclosure decisions and have updated their
expectations about sellers’ qualities. Expected quality for Seller Si is denoted by E(qi).
9
Let the marginal consumer who is indifferent between sellers Si and Si+1 have type zi. We can
easily show that zi =
1
2N
+
pi+1−pi
2t
+ θ
E(qi)−E(qi+1)
2t
Repeating the calculation for zi−1, we derive the demand zi− zi−1 for Seller Si+1:
Di =
∫ θmax
0
∫ zi
zi−1
dzdG(σ) =
1
N
+
pi+1 + pi−1− 2pi
2t
+
θ (2E (qi)−E(qi+1)−E(qi−1))
2t
(2)
7 The mechanism is as follows: given that Seller Si has actual product quality qi, Nature chooses a lower bound qiA
for an uncertainty interval of size α< r, by drawing qiA from the uniform distribution with bounds [qi−α, qi].
8 The analysis of this game stage closely follows Economides (1993).
9 The information structure of the buyers at Stage 3 will be revealed when we analyze Stage 2. In summary we will
find that it is as follows. If the buyers observe that Seller Si disclosed at Stage 2, the buyers’ expected quality E(qi)
for Si is qi (the buyers knows exactly what Si’s quality is). If the buyers observe that Si has not disclosed, the buyers
exclude the upper part of the uncertainty interval and update their expectation for quality to be uniformly distributed
in [qiA, q˜i], where q˜i is given in Lemma 3. (buyers rationally reason that quality cannot fall in [q˜i, qiB ] because in that
case the seller would have disclosed). Buyers’ expected quality E(qi) for Si at the start of Stage 3 is the mid point of
the interval [qiA, q˜i]. At the start of Stage 3, Seller Si takes buyers expectation of E(qi) as given, because he cannot
influence this expectation by signaling through his price: if such a signal existed, it would be costlessly exploited by
all sellers to signal the maximum possible quality and would carry no information to a rational buyer.
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Thus, a firm captures half the buyers that are in between its closest two competitors in the taste
space (first term) adjusted for price differences (second term) and quality differences (third term).
Differentiating Equation 1 with respect to price yields: pi − (pi−1+pi+1)4 = t2N +
θ(2E(qi)−E(qi+1)−E(qi−1))
4
. Substituting into Equation 2 we get D∗i = p
∗
i /t and thus:
Π∗i (p
∗
i ,q,d) = p
∗2
i /t−C (qi)− si (3)
In the pricing subgame, sellers have already chosen their product details and have made their
disclosure decisions. Seller Si maximizes profits with respect to price pi (Equation 1) when: pi −
pi−1
4
− pi+1
4
= t
2N
+ θ
4
(2E (qi)−E (qi+1)−E (qi−1)). In matrix form:
A·p = t
2N
+ θ·H·q (4)
where matrix A has Ai = [Ai,1 = 0,Ai,2 = 0, . . .,Ai,i−1 = −14 ,Ai,i = 1,Ai,i+1 =
−1
4
, . . .,Ai,N = 0], q is
the vector with qi =E (qi) , and H =A−I/2, with A,H circulant symmetric matrices of constants,
so that the inverse of A exist, because the sum of the first row elements is non-zero.
Since A, H are invertible, Equation 4 has a unique solution with
p∗(q) = A−1
(
t
2N
·1 + θ·H·q
)
≡A−1·e(q) (5)
Let bk denote the element of the diagonal at distance |k| from the main diagonal of A−1. Then:
p∗i =
N/2∑
j=−N/2
bjej+i(q) (6)
Figure 3 depicts the pricing equilibrium for N = 5 sellers, and helps us visualize p∗i . The next
two lemmas explain how equilibrium price responds to changes in expected quality. Intuitively, the
lemmas show that an increase in expected quality allows a seller to increase his equilibrium price,
but an increase in the expected quality of a competitor, forces a seller to reduce his equilibrium
price by an amount that depends on how close a neighbor (in the taste space) that competitor is.
Closer taste-space neighbors have greater impact on each other’s prices.
Lemma 1. dp∗i /dE (qi) = θ·b/2, where b= b0− b1
Proof: dp∗i /dE (qi) =
∑N/2
j=N/2 bj (dei+j(q)/dE (qi)) = b0θ/2 − b1θ/4 − b−1θ/4 = θ·b/2 > 0, since
bi = b−i and b= b0− b1 is always positive (Economides 1993). 
Lemma 2. dp∗i /dE (qj) =−θ·bm/2, for i 6=j, where m= j− i
Proof: From Equation 6 (see also Figure 3), dp∗i /dE(qj) = θ (bm/2− bm−1/4− bm+1/4) =
−θ·bm/2, because 4bm = bm+1 + bm−1,∀m 6=0, by the properties of A−1. 
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Figure 3 Equilibrium solution of the pricing stage for N = 5.
Lemma 2 says that if the expected quality of seller Sj increases by χ, Seller Si’s equilibrium price
would decrease by θ · bm · χ/2, where m= j − i. This can be seen in Figure 3: if S2 increased his
quality by χ, S0 would have to respond to the price decreases of S1 and S3 that push S0 price
downwards by −θ ·χ · (b1/4 + b−2/4). To see this in Figure 3, note that from the point of view of
S0, only E(qi+2) and E(qi−3) contribute with minus signs, as they both refer to S2. But S2 would
actually increase his price, as per Lemma 1, so that S0’s price would be somewhat pushed up by
θ ·χ ·b2/2. This comes from the term E(qi+2) that appears in the coefficient of b2. Summing up these
price adjustments S0 would end up decreasing his price by θ ·χ · (b2/2− b1/4− b−2/4) =−θ ·χ ·b2/2.
Figure 3 reveals that all sellers influence each other’s choices, but closer neighbors influence each
other much more so than sellers that are further away. In the case of N = 5 products, the influence
on a seller’s price of his two immediate neighbors is 3 times greater than the influence of the sellers
that are two products apart (in A−15 we observe that b1/b2 = 3). This means that a neighbor’s
change in quality causes 3 times greater response in the seller’s price than the same change in
quality of a seller that is two products apart. The influence of products that are further and further
away diminishes quickly. For example for N = 11 a seller responds to a neighbor’s quality change
with a price adjustment that is 153 times greater than the adjustment by which he responds to
the same quality change of a seller that is 4 products apart (b1/b5 = 153 in the A
−1
11 matrix).
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3.2.2. The Information Disclosure Investment Stage The information structure at this
Stage is as follows. Each Seller Si knows its own quality and has received information about how
Nature realized its quality uncertainty interval. Buyers have not yet made any observations, they
will learn of quality uncertainty intervals and sellers’ disclosure decisions at the end of Stage 2.10
Finally, sellers anticipate that in the pricing stage they will price according to Equation 6.
Lemma 3. Given Seller Si’s quality uncertainty interval [qiA, qiB], there exists a quality level
q˜i ∈ [qiA, qiB], so that Si discloses if, and only if, qi > q˜i⇔ qi ∈ [q˜i, qiB],
Proof: Using Equation 3 and Lemma 1, a seller’s profit (minus the required disclosure cost) is
increasing in perceived quality:
d(Π∗i−si)
dE(qi)
=
dR∗i
dE(qi)
− dC(qi)
dE(qi)
=
2p∗i
t
· dp∗i
dE(qi)
(the quality production cost
has already been incurred in Stage 2, so that now dC(qi)
dE(qi)
= 0). Further, buyers know that sellers
know their actual quality and their uncertainty intervals, and disclosure of quality information
entails a cost c. Thus, our model satisfies the assumptions of the classic analysis of costly quality
disclosure (Verrecchia 1983; Fishman and Hagerty 2003) so that quality information unravels above
a threshold, which we denote as q˜i. 
If Seller Si does not disclose, buyers conclude that his quality cannot be uniformly distributed in
[qiA, qiB]. Instead, they trim the upper part of the quality uncertainty interval and expect quality
to be uniformly distributed in [qiA, q˜i] by arguing that if quality exceeded q˜i the seller would have
disclosed. Thus rational buyers would reduce their expectation of the Seller Si quality to:
qi =
qiA + q˜i
2
(7)
q˜i is such that if δi ≡ q˜i − qi then R∗i (q˜i)− c=R∗i (q˜i− δi), so that the revenue that a seller with
quality q˜i gives up by withholding quality information, is offset by disclosure cost savings. It is
easy to verify that q˜i = qiA + 2δi, so that we can calculate q˜i using Equation 9 in the Appendix for
the value of δi.
11
To summarize, sellers disclose quality information if and only if their quality exceeds the threshold
q˜i within their quality uncertainty interval (exceeds the lower end of their uncertainty interval by
2δi). In general, it may happen that a lower quality seller exceeds this quality threshold inside her
own uncertainty interval, but that a higher quality seller does not (see Figure 5 in Section 4.1).
10 If the buyers were to observe the realization of the uncertainty intervals at this point, they would rationally believe
quality to be uniformly distributed in [qiA, qiB ].
11 In general q˜i may not be unique. However in our case it is. The more complex equation for qi is qi =∫ q˜i
qiA
xfqi(x)
Fqi(q˜i)−Fqi(qiA)dx =
∫ q˜i
qiA
xfqi(x)
Fqi(q˜i)
dx = qiA+q˜i
2
, where fqi(·) and Fqi(·) are the PDF and CDF of qi (the random
variable that corresponds to the actual location of qi inside the uncertainty interval). Because the uniform fqi(·) is
a log-concave function, we can show that given qiA, δi is increasing in q˜i (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 2005), and thus q˜i
is unique, given fqi(·). See (Cheong and Kim 2004). f is log-concave if ln(f) is concave in its support (e.g., uniform,
normal, etc.).
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3.2.3. The Quality Investment Choice Stage The analysis of Stages 3 and 2 suffices for
the intuitive understanding of the paper’s main results. The analysis of Stage 1 (quality investment
choice) is instead presented in the Appendix.
3.2.4. Equilibrium Description Before discussing our results in Section 4, we describe the
sub-game perfect equilibrium. In the Appendix, we show that:
Theorem 1. For θ < 2t/N−2
√
c·t
b·r and v >maxq,i(pi+
t
2N
) , the subgame-perfect equilibrium to the
multi-stage game is as follows12:
Stage 1 Sellers set quality targets given by:
q∗ri =

b·θ
k·N if c > c
′
b·θ
k·N −A if c′′ < c< c′
b·θ
k·N −B if c < c′′
where A, B are given in the Appendix (Lemma 8), c′ is the information disclosure cost
beyond which sellers always withhold information regardless of their quality realization,
and c′′ is the information disclosure cost below which sellers have non-zero disclosure
probability regardless of their quality realization. Both c′ and c′′ are given in Lemma 6.
Stage 2 Seller Si will disclose quality if and only if his quality exceeds the lower limit of his
quality uncertainty interval by
ϕ=
4
θ·b
 t
N
+
 · θ · b
2
−
√(
t
N
+
 · θ · b
2
)2
− t·c
 .
where  is the realization of the error term which measures the Seller’s deviation from his
quality target, with ∈ [−r, r],
Stage 3 Firms’ ex-ante expected price is p∗ = t/N . Actual prices depend on the realization of
qualities and quality uncertainty intervals, and are given by Equation 6:
p∗i =
N/2∑
j=−N/2
bjej+i(q)
In Figure 4 we show an example outcome of the game in a market of N = 3 sellers. Given the
parameter values shown in the figure legend, all sellers invest $0.88, targeting quality level 1.4,
denoted with a line around the cylinder’s circumference. The sellers’ expected profit across all
12 For equilibrium to exist, θ is restricted not to be too large. Above the threshold specified, intense quality competition
leads to high quality production costs that prevent firms from obtaining a positive profit. It is also easy to show that
this restriction on θ suffices for the roots that appear in L1 and L2 to be positive. In the expression for v we account
for the need to have a fully served market, even for buyers with zero sensitivity on quality (σ= 0)
Markopoulos and Hosanagar: Product Design and Information Investments
14
Product 
design 
The market right before any 
information disclosure 
investments 
Random 
factors 
[Prices, Profits] 
Quality 
disclosures  
& beliefs 
Target Quality: 
Quality uncertainty 
interval (centers): 
Ex-ante, actual 
Ex-ante ($): 
Actual ($): 
Seller 1 Seller 2 Seller 3 
1.4 1.4 1.4 
1.55 
(-0.05) 
1.45 
(same) 
1.5 
(+0.1) 
[27%,Yes] [27%,No] [27%,No] 
1.60 1.42 1.48 
[3.33,0.23] [3.33,0.23] [3.33,0.23] 
Expected quality 
by buyers 
[3.63,0.33] [3.10,0.07] [3.27,0.19] 
Seller 1 
Seller 2 Seller 3 
Actual Quality: 1.6 
(+0.20) 
1.45 
(+0.05) 
1.4 
(same) 
Quality investment ($): 0.88 0.88 0.88 
Figure 4 An example game outcome with three sellers. The values of the parameters used are
N = 3,α= 0.25, c= 0.1, k= 0.9, θ= 5, t= 10, r= 1
possible realizations for actual product qualities and quality uncertainty intervals is 0.23, and their
expected product price is 3.33 (which is simply t/N). At this quality investment level, the prior
probability that any given seller will end up investing in quality disclosure is 27%.
Random factors are assumed to be as follows. Both Seller S1 and S2 receive a favorable draw of 
and therefore surpass the expected quality level of 1.4 with their $0.88 investment: S1 by 0.2, and
S2 by 0.05. Actual product qualities are denoted with the small dark squares within the sellers’
quality uncertainty intervals, depicted by the lighter-shaded rectangles. These intervals of length
α = 0.25, which are randomly drawn conditionally on each seller’s actual quality level, represent
buyers’ uncertainty about the true quality of each seller. Note that the center of each uncertainty
interval represents buyer’s expectation of each seller’s quality, E(qi). As we can see, the actual
qualities of S1 and S2 are above the 1.4 quality line, while S3’s quality is exactly on the line. S1
is not favored by Nature’s draw of uncertainty intervals: the center of S1’s uncertainty interval, as
can be seen in the figure, is 0.05 units below his actual quality. S2’s uncertainty interval happens to
be centered exactly on his actual quality, while S3 is heavily favored by Nature with an uncertainty
interval whose center is 0.1 units above his actual quality.
The impact of these random factors is as follows. S1 is favored by Nature, and ends up with the
highest actual product quality. However, buyers somewhat underestimate his true quality, so that
S1 responds by investing in quality disclosure, despite the relatively low 27% prior on disclosure
probability. This happens because, as per Theorem 1, the threshold for disclosure for Seller S1 is
0.013 quality units above the center of the uncertainty interval. Seller S1’s quality is 0.05 units
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above the center of the uncertainty interval, so it is above the threshold. Consequently, buyers
end-up learning S1’s quality and the seller is able to charge $3.63 for his product, versus the $3.33
ex-ante expected price. Despite incurring the $0.1 quality investment cost, his $0.33 profit exceeds
the ex-ante expected profit of $0.23. S2 is, on the contrary, not favored by Nature’s draws. Despite
his somewhat better than expected actual quality of 1.45, neighboring with the high quality S1
forces S2 to lower his price to $3.1 and accept a lower than expected profit of $0.07. Using Theorem
1 we can again verify that the quality disclosure threshold for Seller S2 is 0.034 units above the
center of the uncertainty interval, which is above S2’s quality so that S2 does not disclose. This
causes buyers to somewhat underestimate his quality (1.42 versus 1.45), but S2 is content to operate
this way: saving on the quality investment cost more than justifies the additional price decrease (on
top of the decrease caused by S1 unexpectedly high quality) that S2 is forced to concede. Finally,
things are relatively better for S3 who is heavily favored by Nature’s draws of uncertainty intervals,
with the center of his uncertainty interval 0.1 units above his actual quality (1.5 versus 1.4). As
expected, S3 is happy to forgo quality disclosure, causing buyers to scale-back their expected quality
for the seller to 1.48 (versus uncertainty interval center of 1.5), which is still comfortably higher
than his actual 1.4 quality. Buyers’ relatively high expectations for S3’s quality, combined with the
savings from the forgone quality disclosure investment, allow S3 to largely recover from having an
unexpectedly high quality neighbor attack his market share, and S3 ends up with a price and final
profit that are only somewhat lower than their ex-ante expected values.
4. Results and Managerial Implications
A roadmap of the main results that are explored next is given in Table 2
4.1. Information Disclosure Investments
At the end of the game, each Seller Si would either have disclosed, or not, depending on whether or
not actual quality exceeds the lower end of his uncertainty interval by 2δi, where δi was defined in
Section 3.2.2. However, at the end of the quality selection stage (Stage 1), after sellers learn their
achieved quality, but before they learn how Nature has chosen their quality uncertainty intervals,
they know that the probability of disclosure Pri(qi), given quality qi is:
Pri(qi) = Prob(qi > q˜i) = 1− 2δi/α (8)
In the Appendix, we prove the following Proposition (the intuition is discussed below).
Proposition 1. Let Pri(qi) be the probability that Seller Si will disclose, given quality qi. Then
Pri(qi) can only increase in qi. Moreover, the relationship is continuous.
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Key Question Result Intuition Analysis
Inter-
actions
How sellers
account for
quality when they
invest to reduce
buyer uncertainty
Higher quality sellers
invest more in
reducing quality
uncertainty
Buyers rationally
apply larger discount
to higher quality
products that do not
disclose
§4.1,
Proposition 1,
Figures 5, 6
A
How sellers
account for future
information
investments when
investing in
quality
Sellers moderate
quality investment,
compared to the
perfect information
case
Increasing quality also
increases probability
that a disclosure
investment may be
needed (reducing
quality ROI)
§4.2,
Proposition 2,
Figure 7
A,B
How sellers
account for
ambient
information
availability when
investing to
inform consumers
External information
availability enables
sellers, and especially
lower quality ones,
to free ride
Third party
information reduces
the maximum amount
by which buyers
discount non-disclosing
products
§4.3,
Propositions 3,4
Figures 8, 9
A,C
How sellers
account for
ambient
information
availability when
investing in
quality
Improvements in
external information
availability, may
enable sellers to
reduce quality
investments
Quality becomes a less
important determinant
of profit as a quality
increase is more likely
to lead to future
disclosure costs
§4.4,
Proposition 5,
Figure 10
A,B,C,D
Table 2 Roadmap for the discussion of our main results
Proposition 1 is also true for target product quality qri: the probability of disclosure can only
increase with qri since it is trivial to show that expected actual product quality cannot decrease as
target product quality increases. Further, Proposition 1 takes quality qi as given, without making
any assumptions about how the quality level came to be. Thus, the Proposition would still be valid
even in a model with heterogeneous sellers. For instance, sellers that differ in their cost of quality
production k or quality disclosure c (see Appendix B and the Online Appendix).
It is perhaps intuitively expected that the higher the quality of a product, the higher the seller’s
profit, in case of disclosure. This is in general agreement with most literature on the topic (Jovanovic
1982; Farrell 1986; Verrecchia 1983; Dye 1986; Shavell 1994). However, the model shows something
more subtle: the higher the expected quality of a product, the more the buyers will discount its
quality, should the seller fail to invest in information disclosure. For example: assume that buyers
expect ex-ante that a seller’s quality is uniformly distributed between 4 and 5 units (expected
quality is 4.5). Upon observing that the seller has not disclosed, buyers discount his quality and
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(no disclosure)
qA
qB
q
~q
αq
Current Model
Seller S1
(no disclosure)
q1A
q1B
q1
~q1
q2A
q2B
q2
~q2αq
αq
Seller S2
(disclosure)
Classic Literature
Figure 5 The quality disclosure mechanism in our model, as a refinement of the classic literature.
form new expectations in a range between 4 and 5−x units. Assume now that the buyers expect ex-
ante that another seller’s quality is uniformly distributed between 2 and 3 units (expected quality
is 2.5). Upon observing that the seller failed to invest in quality disclosure, buyers discount the
seller’s quality and form new expectations in a range between 2 and 3− y, where y < x.
The intuition is as follows: Profits are convex in expected product quality because an increase
in quality allows a seller to increase his price (Equation 6) while simultaneously gaining market
share in the taste space (Equation 2). With convexity, for a given quality improvement, a higher
quality seller increases profit more than a lower quality seller does. Thus, a higher quality seller
would invest to improve buyers’ perception even by a small amount, or equivalently, would invest
to prevent even a small decrease of buyers’ expectations about its quality. In other words, buyers
argue that a higher quality seller would surely, if he could, disclose to prevent them from forming
an expectation for quality close to the lower limit of the uncertainty interval, while a lower quality
seller would not necessarily do so. Thus, a non-disclosing higher quality seller signals that he cannot
prevent buyers from expecting quality to be at the lower end of the uncertainty interval, because
this is actually where his true quality lies, and a disclosure would not help in his case.
The mechanism of quality disclosure of our model extends the classic literature that describes
how quality information unravels when disclosure is costly. For example in (Jovanovic 1982) only
sellers beyond a quality threshold (denoted by q˜ in Figure 5) disclose. Consequently, classic liter-
ature favors a quality cut-off approach. A quality improvement does not cause the firm to incur
increased disclosure costs in the future, unless the quality improvement happens to span the dis-
closure threshold. In the current model, while quality unraveling still occurs inside the uncertainty
intervals and while sellers disclose if their quality exceeds a threshold inside the uncertainty interval,
disclosure is probabilistic, since the process that determines the exact position of the uncertainty
interval is probabilistic. Thus, it could happen that a lower quality seller, such as S2 in Figure 5,
exceeds its threshold and discloses, while a higher quality seller, such as S1 does not exceed its
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Figure 6 Disclosure probability as a function of product quality in the PC-Game market
threshold and fails to invest to reduce consumer uncertainty. However, this is not the most likely
outcome. As per our previous discussion, the higher a seller’s quality, the more willing it would be
to disclose and thus the lower the disclosure threshold of the firm inside its uncertainty interval.
This means that as quality increases, the disclosure threshold decreases, and higher quality sellers
are more likely to disclose than lower quality sellers. The probability of disclosure as a function
of quality is given by Lemma 5 in the Appendix, where it can be seen that it also depends on
the strength of consumers’ preferences for quality (firms are more likely to disclose if buyers value
quality more), as well as on the size of the uncertainty interval, as we will discuss in Section 4.3.
To test if disclosure patterns in the real-world are consistent with Proposition 1, we gathered
data on 2,196 PC-games released between 1996 and 2005, from the gaming website GameSpot.
Game developers had a choice to invest in developing playable demo versions of their games, which
could reduce buyer uncertainty about the quality of the game but were also expensive to develop.
In Figure 6, we show the percent of PC-games of the Action genre (N = 418) that have invested
in producing a playable demo version. The graph clearly shows that the higher the game quality,
the greater the probability of the game developer having invested in the development of a playable
demo version. We obtain similar results across game genres, and across release dates.
4.2. Quality Production Decisions
Proposition 2. Quality investment under uncertainty is at most equal to equilibrium quality
under perfect information13.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 8, by showing that A and B are positive. This is true as long as
θ < 2t/N−2
√
c·t
b·r , as we assumed for Theorem 1. Note that quality investment does not monotonically
decrease as α increases. Their more complex relationship is the subject of Proposition 5. 
13 The idea of quality underinvestment under uncertainty was first discussed in (Jovanovic 1982), but was first shown
explicitly by Albano and Lizzeri (2001).
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Figure 7 The mechanism of quality production in our model, as a refinement of the classic literature
In the case of heterogeneous sellers, Proposition 2 should be viewed as referring to the average
prevailing quality in the market, and may not hold for each seller individually (see Appendix B
and the Online Appendix).
The cost of disclosure, c, is the same in our model independent of the seller’s quality. It is then
surprising that this cost causes the seller to moderate the quality investment. The intuition is as
follows. In the previous section we saw that the probability of quality disclosure increases with
product quality, because buyers discount the quality of a non-disclosing firm more at higher quality
levels. Consequently, when a firm decides how much to invest in order to improve product quality, it
has to account for its future expected quality disclosure costs. These future information disclosure
investments act as a hidden quality production cost at the stage of product design and when taken
into account, lead to lower optimal quality, compared with the quality that a firm would have
chosen under a perfect information regime.
Figure 7 explains how quality production in our model differs from classical quality unraveling,
where firms invest in quality disclosure only above a certain quality threshold. The figure shows the
marginal benefit and the marginal cost of quality under perfect information and under uncertainty,
where marginal benefit is defined simply as marginal profits minus the marginal quality disclosure
cost, and are derived by differentiating p∗2i /t− si (from Equation 3) and quality investment cost,
with respect to quality. Obviously, for every firm, equilibrium quality production is determined by
the point where the marginal benefit of an additional quality increase matches the marginal quality
production cost. Under classical quality unraveling, firms disclose quality only above a threshold q˜.
Thus, on the left graph of Figure 7, the marginal benefit of increasing quality at any quality level
below the disclosure threshold q˜, is zero, since quality below the threshold will not be disclosed
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and any quality improvement will go undetected with buyers assuming the worst possible product
quality. However, the marginal benefit of increasing quality, when the quality is above the disclosure
threshold q˜, is the same as the perfect information case, as quality will always be disclosed above
the threshold. Therefore, with classical quality unraveling, optimal quality is either at its minimum
level, or it is the same as the quality under perfect information, depending on whether or not the
marginal cost curve meets the marginal benefit curve above the threshold.
In the current model, the marginal benefit of increasing quality lies below the marginal benefit
under perfect information and non-zero disclosure probability, as we have seen in the previous
section that any quality increase also increases the chances that a quality disclosure cost will be
incurred. Therefore, compared to the perfect information case, our model predicts that firms will
produce lower quality levels under uncertainty, as shown by the arrow on the right of Figure 7.
An example showing firms investing less in quality under uncertainty, concerns hygiene in the
Los Angeles restaurant market, and has been documented in (Jin and Leslie 2003). Prior to 1998,
restaurants were not required to disclose their hygiene inspection results or to use any particular
format when doing so. In 1998 a standardized report card was introduced that made reporting
of hygiene inspections easily understood and comparable across all restaurants in all L.A. county
cities. Each county city was then left to decide on whether or not to force their restaurants to
prominently display these report cards. For cities that passed mandatory disclosure ordinances, the
result was a transition to a perfect information regime, since any quality disclosure costs become
sunk as mandatory. For cities that allowed for voluntary disclosure of health reports, the result
was a reduction of the quality disclosure cost, since standardization had dramatically reduced
the cost of explaining to consumers what the hygiene level of a restaurant was, compared with
other restaurants in the area. This is equivalent to an upwards shift of the marginal benefit curve
in the right hand side of Figure 7, very close to the perfect information marginal curve, which
should also lead to an increase in quality (recall that disclosure costs are included in the marginal
benefit). Indeed, Jin & Leslie documented the subsequent increase in the hygiene levels on both
mandatory and voluntary disclosure cities, as captured by increasing inspection scores, and also
by the reduction of food-related hospital admissions in L.A. county14.
The managerial implication for our stylized example of the printer manufacturers in the Intro-
duction, is that the firms must include the cost of future information disclosure in their quality
production Return on Investment’ (ROI) calculations, alongside items such as materials, Qual-
ity Assurance, and new feature design and development costs. Higher quality levels increase the
probability that the firms will also need a quality disclosure investment. In other words, quality is
14 The authors carefully excluded many potential alternative explanations, such as consumer sorting (consumers
avoiding food-related poisoning by shifting to more hygienic restaurants).
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more expensive than it appears, due to consumer uncertainty. For example, substantial investments
in the quality of future photo printer models, makes it more likely that the manufacturers will
also need to invest to reduce consumer uncertainty about the printers’ quality-related attributes.
Quality improvements in photo printing may increase the chance that the manufacturer will have
to provide detailed information about printer performance, such as accuracy of color rendition, or
print longevity, for different ink-paper combinations. The manufacturer may have to work with
retailers and distributors to provide output samples that demanding buyers will want to examine
from up-close. The larger the quality improvements under consideration, the larger the disclosure
cost that must be accounted for in the ROI calculations of the firms. If the printer manufacturers
fail to take this cost into account, they would be overnivesting in product quality.
4.3. Impact of Ambient Information on Firm’s Information Investments
Proposition 3. For firms with non-zero probability of disclosure, Pri(qi) increases with α.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 5, in the Appendix. 
As with Proposition 1, Proposition 3 is also true for target product quality qri (the probability
of disclosure for a given level of quality investment decreases as α decreases), since expected actual
product quality cannot decrease as target product quality increases. And as with Proposition 1,
Proposition 3 is true with heterogeneous sellers, that differ in their cost of quality production k
and/or quality disclosure c (see Appendix B and the Online Appendix).
The intuition is as follows. Firms’ investments to reduce consumer uncertainty depend on the
amount of ambient information available in the market. Infomediaries, consumer reviews, press cov-
erage, and other third party sources of product information contribute to consumer informedness,
often allowing firms to free ride and forgo their own information disclosure investments. However,
as infomediaries provide more and more information, the sizes of uncertainty intervals that con-
sumers can assign to different products reduces, and the potential for consumers to discount the
quality of a seller who does not disclose diminishes, making non-disclosure less costly.
Google appears to have used information availability by third-parties, to reduce its own infor-
mation disclosure costs. In 2003 the company created a community (Google Forums) where its
customers could answer each other’s questions about the company’s AdWords product. This allowed
Google to forgo the ongoing investment that would be required to fully inform the hundreds of
thousands of customers on product features and use (Levy 2011). Today, Google Product Forums
have been expanded to include all of the company’s products.
Mathematically, the probability that a firm will disclose decreases, as quality uncertainty
decreases. On the left side of Figure 8 we plot the (ex-ante) probability that a firm will invest in
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Figure 8 Ex-ante probability of quality disclosure investments as a function of quality uncertainty (left), and as
a function of target seller qualities (right). Parameter values used are N = 3 (which implies b= 0.8),
k= 0.9, t= 40, θ= 8, r= 1.5
information disclosure, as given in Theorem 1 and Lemmata 5 and 6 . No firm discloses when α is
below a certain threshold relative to the quality disclosure cost, given in Lemma 6.
Further, our model shows that the opportunity for firms to free ride on ambient information and
forgo their own information disclosure investments is relatively greater for lower quality sellers.
This is depicted on the right side of Figure 8, where we can see that as we increase the amount
of ambient information in the market (α reduces from 0.5 to 0.2) the (ex-ante) probability of a
disclosure investment decreases, but more so for lower quality sellers. In other words, it is easier
for lower quality sellers to free ride on third party information. Formally:
Proposition 4. The reduction in the sellers’ (ex-ante) probability of quality disclosure as α
decreases, is greater (in absolute value) at lower product qualities. Mathematically, let Pri(qi, α) be
the probability that Seller Si will disclose, given quality qi and quality uncertainty α, and let x be
a positive constant. Then Pri(qi, α)−Pri(qi, α−x) decreases as qi increases.
Proof: From Lemma 5 in the Appendix, and also using Lemma 1, it can easily be shown by
differentiation that at all product quality levels the derivative of the probability of disclosure with
respect to product quality, decreases as α increases. Proposition 4 is now implied, as the probability
of disclosure as a function of quality will always be steeper at lower α. 
As with Propositions 1 and 3, Proposition 4 is true with heterogeneous sellers, that differ in
their cost of quality production k and/or quality disclosure c (see Appendix B and the Online
Appendix).
The intuition behind this result is that any increase in quality reduces a firm’s disclosure thresh-
old inside its quality uncertainty interval. When the uncertainty interval is relatively small (high
ambient information) even a small decrease in the position of the disclosure threshold can signifi-
cantly affect the probability that a firm’s quality will be below (or above) the threshold. Thus, the
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Figure 9 Impact of 3rd party disclosures to firms’ own disclosure investments (Chen and Xie 2005)
probability of a disclosure investment becomes more sensitive on quality when α is low, as can be
seen on the right side of Figure 8 where the bottom pair of lines is steeper. But, obviously, this
means that the two pairs of lines should converge towards higher qualities, which means that free
riding on ambient information should be less pronounced in higher qualities.
The managerial implication is that firms – especially those with lower quality products – that
plan information disclosure investments, should account for ambient information availability and
be aware of opportunities to free ride. This was nicely demonstrated by Chen and Xie (2005) who
looked at how competing firms adjust their advertising as a response to an independent product
review published in a magazine (see Figure 9). They observed reviews that discuss product quality
and end in a recommendation (or not). As per our analysis, we would expect all firms to respond
to a third party review by reducing the amount of information they disclose. Further, lower quality
firms should reduce their disclosure spend, more than higher quality firms. This is what Chen &
Xie found. Higher quality printers did not significantly change their advertising spend, while lower
quality printers did. Lower quality running shoes reduced their advertising spend, as a response to
a product review, by 71%, compared to 30% reduction for their high quality competitors.
While this example focused on third-party intermediaries, Proposition 4 and the associated
discussion is equally applicable to other ambient information sources besides infomediaries (e.g.
consumer reviews).
4.4. Impact of Ambient Information on Quality
Proposition 5. Large enough improvements in ambient information availability improve equi-
librium quality. However, smaller improvements in information availability may reduce equilibrium
quality.
Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 8 in the Appendix. Also see the left hand side of Figure
10 
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In the case of heterogeneous sellers, Proposition 5 should be viewed as referring to the average
prevailing quality in the market, and may not hold for each seller individually (see Appendix B
and the Online Appendix).
Proposition 5 provides more information than Proposition 2 on the relationship between equilib-
rium quality and consumer uncertainty. It says that we do not need to obtain perfect information
availability for equilibrium quality to improve. Going back to the example of Jin and Leslie (2003),
we see that we do not need to go from a restaurant market with no hygiene information to a
market with perfect hygiene information for hygiene levels to improve. As long as the improvement
in ambient information is sufficient, sellers will improve their quality. This is consistent with the
generally accepted view among practitioners that the dramatic improvements in consumer infor-
mation availability due to third party infomediaries push sellers to improve their quality, as quality
shortcomings are more likely to be exposed15.
However, if ambient information availability is low and improvements are not large enough,
equilibrium quality reduces (see Arrow A in Fig 10) as firms compete less in quality.
The intuition16 builds upon the fact that with improved information, the probability of disclosure
becomes more sensitive to quality, that is, with improved information even small changes in quality
may significantly increase the probability of a future disclosure investment. This is what the right
hand side of Figure 8 shows: the α= 0.2 lines are steeper than the α= 0.5 lines, and this is also
what Proposition 4 says. The above immediately implies that firms will compete less in quality.
This is because with improved information, any quality increase will create larger future disclosure
costs, so that a quality increase becomes less desirable, and sellers will compete less intensely in
quality, exactly as Proposition 5 states and Arrow A in Figure 10 shows.
A simplified arithmetic example is as follows. Imagine that the cost of a quality disclosure
investment is 5, and that, other things equal, a quality increase of 1 unit increases future expected
revenue by 6, net of quality production cost.
If information availability is low, the probability of disclosure may be high, assume it is 50%.
Also assume that the quality increase of 1 unit modestly increases the probability of a future
disclosure from 50% to 70%. Thus the firm that improves quality by 1 unit, other things equal,
increases future profit by 6-0.2x5= 5. That is, the quality improvement increases expected revenue
by 6 units, but increases expected cost by 1 unit from the increase in the disclosure probability.
15 In practice, teasing out the effects of information on quality is not always easy (Anderson and Magruder 2012).
16 The mechanism has many similarities with the mechanism of Dranove and Satterthwaite (2003) where improved
price information leads to less intense quality competition (quality improvements become less attractive to the firms),
and more intense price competition, so that firms reduce their quality. In our model, it is improved quality information
that leads to less intense quality competition.
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Figure 10 Equilibrium quality (left, given in Theorem 1) and expected equilibrium profit (right, derived in
Lemma EC.1 in the Online Appendix) as a function of quality uncertainty. Parameter values used are
N = 3, k= 1, t= 40, θ= 10, r= 1.5
The same firm, under higher information availability, would have a lower probability of disclosure,
i.e., the firm would be more likely to free-ride. Assume that the probability of disclosure is 20%.
But now the increase in quality by 1 unit would increase the probability of a future disclosure
significantly, for example from 20% to 60% (probability of disclosure becomes more sensitive on
quality, with improved information). The increase in future profit is now 6-0.4x5=4.
We see that quality improvements are less attractive to the seller when ambient information
availability is high, so the seller will tend to compete less intensely in quality, which, as expected,
leads to lower equilibrium quality levels.
However, when ambient information improves to the point where some sellers, depending on their
quality realization, no longer wish to improve upon the information made available by infomediaries
(this happens below α′′ shown in Figure 10 and derived in Lemma 6) disclosure probability begins
to depend less on uncertainty, and quality improvements begin to become more attractive to
the sellers (Arrow B in Figure 10). When ambient information improves below α′, sellers always
withhold disclosure, and quality no longer depends on uncertainty α, because disclosure probability
(at zero) is no longer sensitive to quality. Profits are as elastic on quality as they are under perfect
product information.
Consider again the stylized example of the printer manufacturers. The firms wish to know how
the slowly changing information landscape affects how much they should invest in future quality
improvements. Our model predicts that, if uncertainty is high and the improvements in overall
information availability are small, quality investments become less attractive for competing firms as
each quality improvement creates higher future disclosure costs. Then, the firms’ best competitive
response is to decrease product quality investments. However, in the long term, as long as the
improvements in information availability continue, buyers will begin to depend more and more on
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infomediaries and other ambient sources for their information needs. Then, quality improvements
become more attractive and the two competitors will need to start increasing their investments in
printer quality. Given the significant increase in product information availability in recent years
made possible by consumer reviews, third-party infomediaries and search tools, our model suggests
that its net impact will be an increase in investments in product quality.
4.5. Impact on Seller Profitability
The right side of Figure 10 shows how ambient information and information disclosure costs impact
firm profitability. Under very high quality uncertainty, firms almost always disclose (see Figure 8),
and the market resembles a market of perfect information with firms always incurring the disclosure
cost c. Consequently, under high quality uncertainty α, equilibrium profit approaches profit under
perfect quality information minus c (see Arrow C). As α decreases, firms invest less in quality
(Arrow A) and firms save both on quality production and on expected information investment cost
(disclosure probability reduces) so that profits begin to increase (Arrow D) and can exceed profits
under perfect information. Arrow E shows that maximum firm profitability is obtained when α is
such that only some of the firms invest in quality disclosure, but the probability of disclosure is not
yet zero. This is the point that balances low investments in quality (they are minimum at point α′′)
with low investments in quality disclosure (they become zero below α′). As we decrease ambient
information even further (Arrow F), the expected savings in disclosure costs are not enough to
counteract increased quality production costs and profitability begins to decrease again. Note that
profitability for 0<α<α′ is still slightly above the level obtained at α= 0 (the fact that the profit
line in Figure 10 increases for low α is hard to discern because the increase is only slight), because
of a utility transfer from buyers to sellers due to uncertainty. This is shown in Lemma EC.1 in the
Online Appendix.
5. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we investigated an integrated process of product design and product information
investments, and argued that both decisions are influenced by each other and by the availabil-
ity of ambient market information – information which consumers can easily acquire from other
sources. Specifically, we analyzed the first game theoretic model of a competitive market, where
product design and product information investments are endogenous decision variables, affected
by information made available by third parties.
The thread that connects our findings is that information disclosure strategies must be considered
alongside quality investment decisions in an integrated process. To maximize profit, managers must
consider the nuanced ways in which buyers evaluate quality in markets with inherent uncertainty.
In particular, our model indicates that buyers discount the quality of non-disclosing high quality
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firms more so than the quality of non-disclosing low quality firms. There are three managerial
implications that emerge from our study.
First, we showed that, other things equal, quality investment under uncertainty never exceeds
the level of quality investment under perfect information. Thus, forward-looking should be careful
to give due weight to the costs of quality improvement, which are magnified in the presence of
uncertainty, and avoid over-investing in quality.
Second, we showed that firms can take advantage of information that third parties provide, and
avoid their own information disclosure investments. The opportunity to free ride is even greater
for lower quality firms. Managers should consider whether the information that buyers can receive
from third parties is already sufficient, so that they can forgo costly information investments. Of
course, this largely depends on the environment, but as third party infomediaries proliferate, this
advice is increasingly relevant. However, managers of firms with higher quality products should be
more careful when avoiding disclosure investments and relying instead on third party infomediaries:
buyers are shown to be more willing to punish complacency at the higher-ends of product ranges.
Finally, we showed that the intuitive argument that firms must improve their product quality
when overall information availability in the market improves, only holds when the improvement
is significant. If third party infomediaries do not significantly improve information availability in
their market, the firms’ may consider reducing their quality, as the optimal response. Managers
that consider quality selection and quality disclosure planning as an integrated process, may not
only avoid over-investing in quality, but also spot opportunities to reduce quality production costs.
We conclude with some directions for future work. Our model captures interaction between
sellers and buyers in the presence of ambient information through infomediaries or social interaction
among consumers. Presently, we have assumed that this ambient information is an exogenous
characteristic of the market. An interesting extension of our work would be to incorporate the role
of infomediaries as strategic players in the game. Further, after demonstrating that product design
and information disclosure investments should be treated as an integrated process and should
account for information made available by third parties, we must naturally turn our attention to a
detailed empirical evidence for the theory. Indeed, this is necessary to validate our theory, enrich
our recommendations, and make them more actionable and practical.
Appendix A: Symbols used in notation
Symbol Definition
Decision Variables
qri Seller Si’s target quality
pi Seller Si’s product price
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Symbol Definition
∗ The starred version of each variable (as in p∗i ), denotes its value in equilibrium
si Seller Si’s disclosure investment si ∈ {0, c}
Model Parameters
N Number of sellers in the market
v Buyer utility for product of zero quality located at his most preferred type
qi Seller Si’s quality. The target quality qri plus some noise parameter : qi = qri + 
r The error term  (which affects qi) is uniformly distributed in [−r, r]
qi, E(qi) Random variable that corresponds to qi under imperfect information, and its
expected value
[qiA, qiB] Quality uncertainty interval of Seller Si
c Cost for disclosing quality
θ, t The intensity of consumer preference for quality and type, respectively
C(qi), k C(qi) is the quality production cost and equals: C(qi) = k · q2i /2
Derived Values
α Size of the quality uncertainty interval. It equals qiB − qiA
zi Most preferred location of buyer who is indifferent between Sellers Si and Si+1
q Vector with N elements, where element i is E(qi)
q˜i qi q˜i is the value of qi, above which quality is disclosed, and qi is E (qi|qi < q˜i)
δi δi = q˜i− qi. Equals half the disclosure range
Ri, Di, Πi Seller Si’s revenue, unit demand, and profit, respectively
p Vector of prices for all sellers
A, A−1 Symmetric circulant matrix A, and its inverse. A[i, i] = 1,A[i+ 1, i] =−1/4 and
zeros elsewhere
H Matrix H = A− I/2. Used for notational convenience
bi, b bi is element of the diagonal of A
−1 at distance i from main diagonal; b is b0− b1
e Vector defined as e = t/2N ·1 + θ ·H ·q. Used for notational convenience
Pri(·) The probability that Seller Si will invest in quality disclosure, when uncertainty
intervals are not yet known
c′, α′ When c > c′, or when α<α′ sellers always withhold information regardless of
their quality realization
c′′, α′′ When c < c′′, or when α>α′′ sellers have non-zero disclosure probability
regardless of their quality realization.
Appendix B: Heterogeneous sellers
In our model, sellers are identical, except for their placement in the taste space. Our results about quality
disclosure (Propositions 1, 3, and 4) still hold even for heterogeneous sellers that differ in their costs of quality
production and/or quality disclosure. Proofs for the validity of these propositions under seller heterogeneity
are provided in the Online Appendix. The proofs rely on the fact that the last two game stages, on which
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Figure 11 Equilibrium quality as a function of quality uncertainty in a duopoly where the sellers differ in their
costs of quality production. We label the seller with the lower cost of quality production as “Low-quality-cost
seller”, and its competitor as the “High-quality-cost seller”. Parameter values used are
N = 2, k1 = 0.8, k2 = 0.81, c1 = c2 = 0.5, t= 40, θ= 8, r= 2
Proposisions 1, 3, and 4 depend, take target quality qri and actual quality qi as given, without making any
assumptions about how the quality level came to be.
However, without identical sellers, we can find numerical counter-examples to Propositions 2 and 5 (we can
no longer derive closed form solutions for seller qualities across all parameter ranges). For example, Figure
11 shows that it is no longer true that no sellers would choose higher quality under uncertainty, compared
to the perfect information case.
This is expected. Revenue cannot be less elastic in quality for all sellers under imperfect information. If
a seller’s competitors’ have different ex-ante probability of quality disclosure, then this affects how elastic
the seller’s revenue is on target quality. With heterogeneity, for roughly half the sellers we should expect
that the difference in disclosure probability pushes elasticity of revenue on target quality to be lower under
uncertainty (e.g., the sellers with lower than average probability of disclosure), that is, to amplify the impact
described in Proposition 2 and for the other half sellers that the difference in disclosure probability should
push in the opposite direction and counteract the impact described in Proposition 2. Depending on the
degree of seller heterogeneity, we should expect to find sellers with higher target quality under uncertainty.
Nevertheless, this does not imply that the driving forces behind Propositions 2 and 5 are no longer valid:
overall competition for quality is indeed less intense under uncertainty, other things equal, and we should
expect to observe so on average. For example in Figure 11, we depict two sellers that differ in their costs of
quality production. While the low-disclosure-cost seller can have higher quality under uncertainty, compared
to the perfect information case (α= 0), the average target quality behaves similarly to Figure 10 where the
sellers where identical.
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In the Online Appendix, we study the case of duopoly competition with heterogeneous sellers in more
detail, including sellers that also differ in their costs of quality disclosure. In summary, our paper’s results
about quality disclosure do not depend on seller homogeneity (Propositions 1, 3, and 4), and the results
about quality production describe forces that are present even in the case where the sellers are heterogeneous.
Then, Propositions 2 and 5 describe how the average quality depends on quality uncertainty, rather than
the quality of each and every seller in the market.
Appendix C: Proofs and derivations
C.1. Stages 3 and 2
The Pricing Stage of the game (Stage 3) and the Information Disclosure Investment Stage (Stage 2) have
already been analyzed in Section 3.2.
C.2. The Quality Choice Stage (Stage 1)
In this stage, firms anticipate that later, in the information disclosure stage, the probability that they will
disclose will increase with their quality choice at the present stage. Firms further anticipate that, in the final
game stage, prices will follow the non-cooperative equilibrium given in by Equation 6.
Before we can calculate how sellers choose qualities, we must first calculate the probability that sellers
assign to the event that they will have to incur a disclosure cost in the future. Specifically, we need to
calculate the quantity δi that appears in Equation 8: Pri(qi) = 1−2δi/α. To do that, we must first know the
distribution f
′
qi
of E(qi), before the uncertainty intervals realize.
Lemma 4. Before uncertainty intervals realize, E(qi) is a random variable E(qi) = qi+ϕ, with ϕ a random
variable with support [−δi, δi] and PDF f ′qi given by: Pri(qi) · δ(ϕ) + (1−Pri(qi)) · 12δi , where δ(ϕ) is Dirac’s
delta function. Furthermore, f
′
qi
has the following properties:∫ δi
−δi
ϕ · f ′qi(ϕ) · dϕ= 0,
∫ δi
−δi
s · f ′qi(ϕ) · dϕ= s,
∫ δi
−δi
ϕ2 · f ′qi(ϕ) · dϕ=
α2 (1−Pri(qi))3
12
Proof: Shown in the Online Appendix
In equilibrium, all sellers choose their quality disclosure strategy according to Lemma 3 and Seller Si
chooses his optimal quality disclosure threshold q˜i, consistent with every other seller Sj optimally choosing
quality disclosure threshold q˜j . The quantity δi ≡ q˜i−qi is given as a function of qi by: (see Online Appendix):
δi(qi) =min
[
2
θ · b
(
p∗i (qi|∀j 6= i :E (qj) = qrj)−
√
p∗i (qi|∀j 6= i :E (qj) = qrj)2− t · c
)
, α/2
]
(9)
Buyers discount non-disclosing products by α/2 − δi > 0, since buyers update their expectation for the
product’s expected quality from qiA +α/2 to qiA + δi, as δi was defined to be δi ≡ q˜i− qi.
Note that Seller Si’s equilibrium price in Equation 9, is the price that Seller Si would have chosen if for
all other sellers E(qj) exactly matched qrj . In other words, the formula says that a seller who must choose
his quality disclosure threshold q˜i, optimizes by assuming that for every competitor Sj, E(qj) will neither
overestimate nor underestimate the competitor’s target quality qrj . For simplicity, the remaining of the article
will somewhat abuse the notation and use p∗i (qi) to mean: p
∗
i (E(qi) = qi|∀j 6= i :E (qj) = qrj).
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We can now calculate the probability Pri(qi) that Seller Si will disclose, given actual quality qi, as well
as the quality investment cost c′ and quality uncertainty α′ beyond which sellers always withold disclosure,
and the quality investment cost c′′ and quality uncertainty α′′ beyond which sellers always have a positive
probability of disclosure, regardless of the realization of their quality, given their quality target.
Lemma 5. Pri(qi) =max
[
0,1− 4
θ·b·α
(
p∗i (qi)−
√
p∗i (qi)2− t · c
)]
Proof: The Lemma is proven by substituting δ in Equation 8 with its value from Equation 9. 
Lemma 6. A seller with target quality qri will never disclose when c > c
′, or when α < α′, where c′ and
α′ are obtained by solving for c and for α the equation
∫ r
−r
Pri(qri+)
2r
d = 0, or equivalently, the equation
1 − 4
θ·b·α
(
p∗i (qri) +
r·θ·b
2
−
√(
p∗i (qri) +
r·θ·b
2
)2− t · c) = 0. Also, a seller with target quality qri will always
disclose with positive probability when c < c′′, or when α > α′′, where c′′ and α′′ are obtained by solving for
c and for α the equation 1− 4
θ·b·α
(
p∗i (qri)− r·θ·b2 −
√(
p∗i (qri)− r·θ·b2
)2− t · c)= 0
Proof: Given that Pri(qri) is never less than zero (from Lemma 5),
∫ r
−r
Pri(qri+)
2r
d= 0 checks that the
probability is zero throughout all possible realizations of actual product quality, given target product quality.
Given that the probability increases with quality (Proposition 1), we can also obtain c′ or α′ by solving for
c and α respectively the equation Pri(qri + r) = 0. Using Lemma 1 this equation becomes Pri(qri + r) = 1−
4
θ·b·α
(
p∗i (qri) +
r·θ·b
2
−
√(
p∗i (qri) +
r·θ·b
2
)2− t · c)= 0. Similarly for c′′ or α′′, where we solve for Pri(qri−r) =
0. 
Proposition 1 Let Pri(qi) be the probability that Seller Si will disclose, given quality qi. Then Pri(qi)
can only increase in qi. Moreover, the relationship is continuous.
Proof: The second part of the Proposition, that the relationship between Pri(qi) and qi is continuous, is
easily verifiable by the analytical description of the probability in Lemma 5. The first part of the proposition,
that Pri(qi) can only increase in qi, can be proven either by starting from Equation 9, or by starting from
Lemma 5. In the first approach, as long as δi has not reached its maximum value α/2, it decreases in
equilibrium price p∗i : dδi/dp
∗
i = · · ·= 2θb
(
1− p∗i /
√
p∗2i − t · c
)
< 0. Thus dδi
dE(qi)
=
(
dδi
dp∗
i
)
·
(
dp∗i
dE(qi)
)
= dδi
dp∗
i
· θb
2
< 0.
Further, given qiA, δi is 1− 1 with q˜i and it is also true that dE(qi)/dqi > 0. Thus, we obtain dδi/dE(qi)<
0 ⇐⇒ d(q˜i− qiA)/dE(qi)< 0 ⇐⇒ d(q˜i− qiA)/dqi < 0. Fixing qiA also fixes qiB, and so d(qiB− q˜i)/dqi > 0, so
that Prob(qi > q˜i) is increasing in qi. Also accounting for the fact that δi cannot exceed α/2 (or equivalently
Prob(qi > q˜i) ≥ 0) we conclude that Prob(qi > q˜i) is non-decreasing in qi. Thus, the probability of quality
disclosure in Stage 2 can only increase with seller’s quality qi, which completes the proof.
The Proposition 1 is also true for target product quality qri (the probability of disclosure can only increase
with qri) since expected actual product quality cannot decrease as target product quality increases. 
To calculate the equilibrium, only the conditional expected profit of Seller Si (which takes competitor
choices as given) is required. Using Lemma 1 and Equations 3 and 6, conditional expected profit is 17:
17 We assume that r >> α so that we can account for different realizations of the quality uncertainty interval by
integrating in Equation 10 over
∫ δi
−δi f
′
qi(ϕ)dϕ everywhere, knowing that the value added by the part of the uncertainty
interval that may fall above qri+r or below qri−r can be made as low as required, for sufficiently large r or sufficiently
small α (recall that δi is bound by α/2). In fact the expected profit obtained for r > 2α in Figure 10 yields equilibrium
target qualities that are within 99.9% of the true value, even if we omit to integrate over
∫ δi
−δi f
′
qi(ϕ)dϕ in Equation
10 altogether (see Proof of Lemma 8). Thus in practice the requirement that r >>α is not necessary.
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E (Π(qri)) =
=E
(
p∗i (qi|qri))2
t
− k · q
2
ri
2
− c ·Pri(qi|qri)
)
=
∫ r
−r
∫ δi
−δi
(
p∗i (qri++ϕ)
2
t
− k·q2ri
2
− c ·Pri(qri + )
)
· d
2r
f
′
qi
(ϕ)dϕ=
=
∫ r
−r
(∫ δi
−δi
(
p∗i (qri + ) +
θ·b·ϕ
2
)2
t
f
′
qi
(ϕ)dϕ− k · q
2
ri
2
− c ·Pri(qri + )
)
· 1
2r
d=
=
∫ r
−r
(
p∗i (qri + )
2
t
+ 0 +
∫ δi
−δi
(θ · b ·ϕ)2
4t
f
′
qi
(ϕ)dϕ− k · q
2
ri
2
− c ·Pri(qri + )
)
· 1
2r
d= . . .=
=
∫ r
−r
((
p∗i (qri) +
θ·b·
2
)2
t
− k · q
2
ri
2
− c ·Pri(qri + ) + α
2 · b2 · θ2 (1−Pri(qri + ))3
48t
)
· 1
2r
d ⇐⇒ . . . ⇐⇒
E (Π(qri)) =
p∗i (qri)
2
t
+
θ2b2r2
12t
− k · q
2
ri
2
+
∫ r
−r
(
α2 · b2 · θ2 (1−Pri(qri + ))3
48t
− c ·Pri(qri + )
)
· 1
2r
d (10)
We will also use the following Lemma which we prove in the Online Appendix:
Lemma 7. q∗ri = arg maxqri Π (qri|∀j 6= i :E(qj) = qrj)
Using Lemma 7 and working with the competitors target qualities qrj , instead of the random variables
qj , and assuming that all vendors except vendor Si have chosen target qualities qrj = q,∀j 6= i, then from
Equation 6 (see also Figure 3):
p∗i (qri|∀j 6= i :E(qj) = q) =
N/2∑
j=−N/2
(
bj
t
2N
)
+
b · θ
2
(qri− q) = t
2N
 N/2∑
j=−N/2
bj
+ b · θ
2
(qri− q) ⇐⇒
p∗i (qri|∀j 6= i :E(qj) = q) =
t
N
+
b · θ
2
(qri− q) (11)
because the sum of elements of any row of A−1 equals 2.
Lemma 8.
q∗ri =

b·θ
k·N if c > c
′
b·θ
k·N −A if c′′ < c< c′
b·θ
k·N −B if c < c′′
where A is given by A = 192N
2tB2+384Nt2B+256t3−32N(NB+2t)2L1−b3N3(α3−32r3)θ3−16cN3t(4L1+3αbθ)
96αkN3tB
, and
B is given by B = (2cN
2t+4t2+F2N2)(L1−L2)−4N·t·F (L1+L2)+24Ft2+2F3N2
3αkN2tF
, with F = b · r · θ, L1 =√
(b · r · θ+ 2t/N)2− 4c · t), L2 =√(b · r · θ− 2t/N)2− 4c · t), and c′ and c′′ given in Lemma 6.
Proof: Seller Si optimizes quality production when θE (Π (qri))/θqri = 0, where expected profit is given
by Equation 10. Using Lemma 5, Equations 10 and 11, setting qri = q and solving for q, we find the symmetric
equilibrium in target qualities, to which every seller is responding optimally to all other sellers having chosen
quality q as their target quality.
There exist three different cases. If for all sellers
∫ r
−r
c·Pri(qri+)
2r
d = 0 (which implies c > c′) then, from
Lemma 5, for all sellers Pri(qi) = 0. Setting qri = q in θE (Π (qri))/θqri = 0, and solving for q, we obtain
p∗i = t/N , and qri =
θ·b
k·N . If, c < c
′′, all sellers have non-zero disclosure probability and from Lemma 5
Pri(qi) = 1− 4θ·b·α
(
p∗i (qi)−
√
p∗i (qi)2− t · c
)
. Then qri =
b·θ
k·N −B.
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For c′′ < c< c′ the disclosure probability Pri(qri + ) that appears in Equation 10 is either Pri(qri + ) = 0
or Pri(qri+) = 1− 4θ·b·α
(
pi(qri) +
θ·b·
2
−
√(
pi(qri) +
θ·b·
2
)2− t · c), depending on the value of . Solving 1−
4
θ·b·α
(
pi(qri) +
θ·b·
2
−
√(
pi(qri) +
θ·b·
2
)2− t · c)= 0 for  we obtain = 16c·t−8α·b·θ·pi(qri)+α2b2θ2
4αb2θ2
. In Equation
10 we take the integral
∫ 16c·t−8α·b·θ·pi(qri)+α2b2θ2
4αb2θ2
−r using Pri(qri + ) = 0 and
∫ r
16c·t−8α·b·θ·pi(qri)+α2b2θ2
4αb2θ2
using
Pri(qri + ) = 1 − 4θ·b·α
(
pi(qri) +
θ·b·
2
−
√(
pi(qri) +
θ·b·
2
)2− t · c). Setting qri = q in θE (Π (qri))/θqri = 0,
and solving for q, we obtain b·θ
k·N −A.
This concludes the Proof. 
Theorem 1 The subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Combining Equations 6 and 9, and Lemma 8, we obtain Theorem 1. The value of ϕ in the
Theorem is obtained by calculating 2δ using Equation 9 and using the equilibrium values for all target
qualities, and Lemma 1. The ex-ante expected price is calculated by integrating for all possible realizations
of actual product qualities and quality uncertainty intervals. 
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